Taxation—Depreciation Deduction—Useful Life—Salvage Value.—Massey Motors, Inc. v. United States; Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Evans by Schwartz, Edward A
Boston College Law Review
Volume 2 | Issue 2 Article 34
4-1-1961
Taxation—Depreciation Deduction—Useful
Life—Salvage Value.—Massey Motors, Inc. v.
United States; Commissioner of Internal Revenue
v. Evans
Edward A. Schwartz
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Tax Law Commons
This Casenotes is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information,
please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Edward A. Schwartz, Taxation—Depreciation Deduction—Useful Life—Salvage Value.—Massey
Motors, Inc. v. United States; Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Evans, 2 B.C.L. Rev. 439 (1961),
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol2/iss2/34
CASE NOTES
Clearly, none of these elements of economic substance are to be found in the
principal case.
The alarm of the minority, generated by the majority's designation of
the "sham test" was unnecessary, for it is doubtful that a new "guidepost"
was actually being created. Before the court can characterize any transac-
tion as a sham, the individual components of the arrangement must be
separately examined. They must be measured against the already existing
guideposts of personal liability, definitions of maturity, and substantial
economic substance. It is only when the separate parts fail to meet the
mark that the whole is designated a "sham" and interest incident to the
transaction is disallowed as a deduction from gross income.
ANDREW C. SCHULTZ
Taxation—Depreciation Deduction—Useful Life—Salvage Value.—
Massey Motors, Inc. v. United States; Commissioner of Internal Revenue
v. Evans.'—In each of these companion cases the Court applied Section
23(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 to establish the correct deprecia-
tion equation2 for computing the depreciation allowance in given tax years in
respect to automobiles employed in rental and complementary uses. In the
Massey case taxpayer owned an automobile agency which leased out new
model cars and employed current models for company use. Using the
straight-line method in computing his yearly depreciation allowance for the
cars, taxpayer claimed a useful life of 4 years and a salvage value of zero.
These cars would be resold within 15 ,months and if the resale price was
greater than the remaining undepreciated cost, taxpayer would claim a*
capital gain. In the Evans case, taxpayer computed depreciation with respect
to the automobiles rented to a U-Drive agency on the same basis as did
taxpayer Massey. In both cases the Commissioner of Internal Revenue took
issue with the depreciation allowances on the theory that the useful life of
the automobiles should equal their useful life in the taxpayer's business
rather than their physical life, and that upon disposition the salvage value
should equal their resale value rather than their junk value. Taxpayer
Massey succeeded in his claim for a tax refund in the United States District
Court,3 but the decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit. 4 The Commissioner's ruling that taxpayer Evans had a tax defi-
ciency was supported by the Tax Court, 5 but the decision was reversed by the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ('
The Supreme Court in a 5-4 decision HELD: The business taxpayer
364 U.S. 92 (1960).
(Total cost) — (Salvage value)2 	
 — Yearly depreciation allowance.(Years of estimated life)
3 156 F. Supp. 516 (S.D. Fla. 1959).
4 264 F.2d 552 (5th Cir. 1959).
5 16 C.C.H. Tax Ct. Mem. 639 (1957).
6 264 F.2d 502 (9th Cir. 1959).
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must compute his yearly depreciation allowance for rented automobiles over a
period of time equal to the estimated useful life of the assets in his business,
and, in so computing, the salvage value must equal the reasonable resale
value of said assets on disposition.
As a result of this decision, the business taxpayer who employs an asset
in his business for a period of time less than the physical life must, in com-
puting the total cost to be allocated for depreciation purposes, using the
straight-line mode, 7
 subtract the resale value from the original cost, then
divide the remainder by the number of years of use in the business; the
quotient is then deducted from his yearly gross income. For the straight-line
taxpayer, the unhappy effect will be increased yearly income taxes and re-
duced capital gains taxes in the years he disposes of these assets. The effect
on the Government will be substantially increased revenues from such tax-
payers—a very satisfactory effect.
The administrative and judicial development of "useful life" and
"salvage value", as terms in the business taxpayers' depreciation formula,
is mirrored by the Supreme Court split in the Massey and Evans decisions.
These terms were explicitly defined in a Treasury Regulation released in
1956,8
 which climaxed a series of regulations and bulletins that had wavered
between support of the Commissioner's theory 8 and that of the taxpayers."
The courts also vacillated in their positions as to the correct application of
the terms. However, it should be noted that the definition of the terms was
never the legal issue in these cases. In several cases the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue succeeded in convincing the court to require a number of
taxpayers to depreciate business vehicles over the entire physical life of the
vehicles rather than to depreciate them over the shorter period of time in
which the vehicles were actually used in the business." In so doing, the
Commissioner was able to lengthen the depreciation period, which reduced
the annual depreciation allowances, and increased the taxpayer's taxable
income. In other cases, the court swung almost 180 degrees and ruled that
depreciation must be computed not on a physical life-junk value basis, but
rather on a shorter, useful life-resale value basis. In these cases the Com-
missioner also desired to increase the taxable income, but here he accom-
7
 The case of Hertz Corp. v. United States, 364 U.S. 122 (1960), was decided at
the same time as the principal case and extended Treas. Reg. § 1.167(b)(2) (1956) to
the declining balance and other accelerated depreciation methods allowed under the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954. The IRC of 1954 further provides that these methods
may only be employed if the depreciable asset has a useful life of at least 3 years.
Thus, in bolding that the term "useful life" means the useful life in the taxpayer's busi-
ness, the Court put these accelerated depreciation methods out of the reach of taxpayers
such as Hertz, Massey, and Evans.
8 Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)(b)(c) (1956).
9
 Treas. Reg. 33, art. 130 (1914); Treas. Reg. 103, § 19-23(1)-1, 19-23(1)-2 (1940);
Int. Rev. Bull. F. Pt. 1 (1942).
10 Treas. Reg. 111, 29-23(1) (1942); Rev. Rul. 108, 1953-1 Cum. Bull. 185; Rev.
Rul. 54-229, 1954-1 Cum. Bull. 124.
11 Sanford Cotton Mills, 14 B.T.A. 1210 (1929); Max Kurtz, 8 B.T.A. 679 (1927);
Merkle Broom Co., 3 E.T.A. 1084 (1925).
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plished this by increasing the salvage value of the asset, which in turn reduced
the depreciation base. These cases found the Commissioner on both the
successful and unsuccessful sides."
In the light of the inconsistent positions taken by the courts and the
Commissioner, if the Court had reached a contrary decision it would not
have been surprising. The majority rested its decision on its view of the
basic purpose of depreciation and depreciation accounting. In Detroit Edison
Co. v. Commissioner" the Court said: "The end and purpose of it all
[depreciation accounting] is to approximate and reflect the financial con-
sequences to the taxpayer of the subtle effects of time and use on the value
of his capital assets." To illustrate: Taxpayer purchases for a market value
of $2000 a depreciable business asset with an economic life of 4 years, which
he sells for the market value of $1500 2 years later. The actual devaluation
of this asset during these two years, and the only amount which logically rep-
resents the cost of the taxpayer's using depreciable assets in his business,
would be $500. To allow the taxpayer to deduct as his expense the devalua-
tion of the asset after he resells it, as in essence taxpayers Massey and Evans
advocated, would be to alter this accepted purpose of depreciation. In
treating this purpose as the crucial factor in its holding, the Court was able
to demonstrate that the Commissioner's contention of "useful life" and
"salvage value" was not first established in 1956, but were merely undefined
in the tax years in dispute.' 4
Although the majority holding in the Massey and Evans cases may be
justified, this is not to conclude that it is practical. The possible effect of
these cases will be to involve both the Treasury and the taxpayers in long
and costly litigation on such questions as: 1) Was the useful life employed
by the taxpayer reasonable in the light of past business experience? 2) Could
the taxpayer reasonably have foreseen forthcoming economic pressures which
forced early resale of his asset? And 3) Was the forecasted salvage value
reasonable? The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 does provide for some altera-
tion of the depreciation allowances during the life of the asset," but there still
remain too many unchecked variables to avoid extensive litigation. The
solution might be found in the repeal of Section 1231 of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954," which should eliminate the basic bone of contention—capital
gains or ordinary income upon the resale of the asset. With this section
12 W.H. Norris Lumber Co., 7 C.C.H. Tax Ct. Mem. 728 (1948); L.A. Davidson,
12 C.C.H. Tax Ct. Mem. 1080 (1953); Bolta Co., 4 C.C.H. Tax Ct. Mem. 1067 (1945);
First Nat'l Bank, 30 B.T.A. 632 (1934); Suncrest Lumber Co., 25 B.T.A. 375 (1932).
18 319 U.S. 98, 101 (1943).
14 The dissenting Justices in the Massey and Evans cases did not disagree with
the majority as to the proper definition of the terms "useful life" and "salvage value,"
but rather as to the retrospective application of the 1956 Treasury Regulation to pre-
1954 tax years.
15
 Treas. Reg. § 1.167(b)-2(c) (1956). This section allows for alteration of the
useful life of an asset during the depreciation period.
16 In essence, this section allows the taxpayer to compute a capital gain on the
resale of his depreciated asset.
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omitted, the taxpayer will strive for accuracy in depreciation and the Gov-
ernment will theoretically be in the same position regardless of whether the
asset was correctly depreciated."
EDWARD A. SCHWARTZ
Trade Regulation—Clayton Act Section 3—Requirement Contracts—
Substantial Share of Relevant Market.—Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville
Coal Co. 1—Tampa Electric, a public utility situated in peninsular Florida,
supplies electric energy to some eleven percent of Florida's population.
Having started the construction of a new generating plant, Tampa entered
into a contract by which it was obligated to buy the total coal requirements
of two of the plant's contemplated six units from Nashville Coal Co. for a
twenty year period. Nashville Coal was only one of 700 coal producers in
the Appalachian coal area who could serve Tampa. Previous to this contract,
every electrical generating plant in peninsular Florida burned oil as burner
fuel. Tampa's coal requirements were expected to vary between one and two
million tons per year, at a minimum cost of $128,000,000 over the twenty
year contract term. Thus, within a few years of the contract starting date,
the utility's coal consumption would surpass that of the remainder of the
state. Just prior to the contract starting date, Nashville notified Tampa that
it would not perform because the contract was in violation of the federal
antitrust laws.2 Tampa Electric brought declaratory judgment proceedings
against Nashville to have the contract declared valid and enforceable. The
District Court granted respondent's motion for summary judgment 3 and
the Court of Appeals affirmed. 4 On writ of certiorari the Supreme Court
reversed. HELD: the contract does not violate Section 3 of the Clayton
Act as the competition foreclosed by the contract does not constitute a
substantial share of the relevant market.
The "rule of reason" test developed in interpreting the Sherman Act. 5
It necessitated, in each case, an analysis of the case in the light of a broad
public policy, hospitable to competition and cold to monopoly, to see
17 "Theoretically" is used because the taxpayer could have changed tax brackets
since deducting the depreciation allowances.
1 81 Sup. Ct. 623 (1961).
2 "It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such
commerce, to lease or make a sale or contract for sale of goods .. . for use, consump-
tion, or resale within the United States . • . on the condition, agreement, or understand-
ing that the lessee or purchaser thereof shall not use or deal in the goods . . . of a
competitor or competitors of the . . . seller where the effect of such lease, sale, or con-
tract for sale or such condition, agreement, or understanding may be to substantially
lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce." 38 Stat. 731
(1914), 15 U.S.C, 14 (1958). Respondents also argued that the contract violated the
Sherman Act, 26 Stat, 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §¢ 1-2 (1958).
3 168 .F. Supp. 456 (M.D. Tenn. 1958).
4 276 F.2d 766 (6th Cir. 1960).
5
 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
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